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Below are two cases, Wounded Warrior Project and American Legacy Foundation, that focus on 
similar issues. In both these cases a lack of governance and oversight led to misuse of funds and 
fraud. These cases may be used together or individually. The sections on implications for theory 
and policy, suggestions for classroom instruction, activities, discussion questions, and resources 
apply to both cases. In addition, one may choose to zero in on either the governance issues, fraud 
and financial oversight, or both of these topics. 
 
What Went Wrong at the Wounded Warrior Project? 
Ruth Bernstein, University of Washington Tacoma 
Jeff Aulgur, Arkansas Tech University 
 
 
The Wounded Warrior Project (WWP) is the largest veteran’s charity in the United 
States. John Melia, a Somalia-wounded Marine veteran initiated, the Wounded Warrior Project 
when he started giving backpacks full of items to returning Iraq war veterans in 2003. The WWP 
projected was incorporated on February 23, 2005, for “the purposes of providing vital programs 
and services to severely wounded service members and veterans to support their transition to 
civilian life as well-adjusted citizens, both physically and mentally” (Internal Revenue Service, 
2014, p. 2). 
On March 9, 2016, the WWP board of directors terminated Chief Executive Officer Steve 
Nardizzi and Chief Operations Officer Al Giordino. The termination of Nardizzi and Giordano 
occurred after multiple news reports “highlighted lavish spending, including extravagant parties 
and events, and cited dozens of former staff members describing a toxic leadership culture at the 
popular veterans charity” (Cahn, 2016). Before the termination of its top two executives, the 
organization vigorously defended itself against accusations of extravagant spending on staff 
conferences and events, spending too little on programs for veterans, and too much on 
fundraising (McCambridge, 2016).  
Responding to the May 2016 findings of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s investigation 





really validates Wounded Warrior Project’s claims that we’re not disgruntled employees, 
because we’re not. . . We were just upset about the way money was spent, and we’re passionate 
about those that have served our country” (Bauerlein, 2016).  Millette and six other Wounded 
Warrior Project employees went public in late 2015 with claims of lavish spending and the 
wasting of donor funds. 
John Melia hired Steven Nardizzi, who was head of the United Spinal Association, to join 
the WWP. Soon, Nardizzi and Melia were fighting for control of the organization’s direction.  In 
2009, Melia resigned from the organization he created and Nardizzi became president. Nardizzi 
envisioned an aggressive metric-driven organization modeled after corporate America: “I look at 
companies like Starbucks - that’s the model. You're looking at companies that are getting it right, 
treating their employees right, delivering great services and great products, then are growing the 
brand to support all of that” (Phillips, 2016).  Under Melia’s leadership, the organization 
experienced incredible financial growth, as total revenues increased from $26.1 million in 2008 
to $342 million in 2013. At the end of the 2013 fiscal year, the Wounded Warrior Project had 
$22 million in cash on hand and $212 million invested in securities.  Net assets now exceeded 
$248 million. 
In March 2016, following intense media scrutiny, the WWP board issued a statement 
claiming an independent audit found the organization spent 81% of donations on programming.  
The board also noted the use of joint cost allocation, common among nonprofits but disregarded 
by organizations that monitor charity spending. Joint cost allocation is considered a Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP).  
 
Table 1: WWP Revenue, Expenses, Assets and Fundraising Costs 
     





     
Tax Year     
     
2005 $     1.0 $     0.9 $     3.0 $   0.4 
2006 $   18.6 $   15.6 $     6.0 $   2.0 
2007 $   21.5 $   19.2 $     8.2 $   3.5 
2008 $   26.1 $   26.6 $     7.8 $   6.2 
2009 $   40.9 $   34.3 $   14.6 $   9.3 
2010 $   74.0 $   57.7 $   30.3 $ 13.8 
2011 $ 154.9 $   95.5 $   90.2 $ 20.5 
2012 $ 234.6 $ 158.1 $ 166.6 $ 31.7 
2013 $ 342.0 $ 248.0 $ 248.2 $ 43.4 
Note.  Figures in $ millions. All data extracted from IRS Form 990 for each respective tax year.  
 
After their termination, Nardizzi and Giordano asked the WWP board of directors to 
release the report. However, in a written statement, the board indicated a written report did not 
exist, and the investigators’ findings were given orally to the board and that such reviews 
typically do not result in written reports.   
In 2014, the WWP claimed it supported 398 veterans and their caregivers, assisted 302 
veterans in gaining employment, and coordinated four-day cycling opportunities, known as 
Soldier Rides, for an additional 156 veterans.  In a reviewing of perceived criticisms of the 
WWP,  the Independent Voter Project stated that for an entity generating nearly $235 million in 
revenue, “numbers like those seem curiously low. Still another question is raised by just how 
some of the services that it [WWP] funded actually helped veterans recover from post-traumatic 
stress or rehabilitate from combat-related wounds” (Schuette, 2014).  A fourth of the $5.5 
million in grants issued were utilized by receiving organizations for recreational activities, and 
additional $5.7 million was spent producing the highly-visible Soldier Rides.  Other grants 
provided by the WWP included $300,000 for a parade, $50,000 for a monument, and $25,000 





Criticism emerged in 2014 from veterans’ advocates and veterans themselves, stating the 
WWP is more concerned with image and public relations impact than it is the long-term well-
being of those it claims to serve (Mak, 2014). A double-amputee who served in Iraq, on the 
condition of anonymity, expressed not only a fear of retribution but disappointment: “They are 
such a big name within the veterans’ community. I don’t need to start a war in my own backyard.  
They’re more worried about putting their label on everything than getting down to brass tacks.  It 
is really frustrating.”  The veteran, who survived an IED destroying his supply truck, continued, 
“Everything they do is a dog-and-pony show, and I haven’t talked to one of my fellow veterans 
that were injured. . . actually getting any help from the Wounded Warrior Project. I’m not just 
talking about financial assistance; I’m talking about help, period” (Mak, 2014). 
A significant part of the WWP’s revenue strategy is the result of branded partnerships, 
and The Daily Beast noted this includes “everything from ketchup to paper towels to playing 
cards - something that rubs other veterans’ groups the wrong way.”  As stated by one alumni 
member, “I receive more marketing stuff from them, [and see more of that] than the money 
they’ve put into the community here in Arizona. It’s just about numbers and money to them. 
Never once did I get the feeling that it’s about the veterans.”  The same member said there were 
times he could have used a ride to a Veterans Affairs medical facility. Instead of a ride he 
received a “fleece beanie” (Mak, 2014). 
In 2013, the WWP reported $189 million in program services expenses including $42 
million in program grants to third-party organizations (Internal Revenue Service, 2013). Of the 
$42 million in program services grants, the WWP included $28 million it transferred to the 
newly-created Wounded Warrior Long-Term Trust.  Excluding this transfer of cash, only 9% of 






Table 2: WWP Reported Program Expenditures and Grants (2013) 
    
 Expenses Program 
Grants 
 % Grants / 
Expenses 
    
Program    
    
Alumni Association $   37,093,075  $   4,700,682 12 % 
Combat Stress Recovery $   27,946,118 $   4,670,046 17 % 
Physical Health & Wellness $   16,033,248 $      644,108 4 % 
Soldier Ride $   15,738,906 $        85,809 1 % 
Benefit Services $   10,280,128 $      487,528 5 % 
Track $     7,600,723 $      852,136 11 % 
Family Support Services $     6,481,174 $      651,233 10 % 
International Services $     5,762,792 $      236,919 4 % 
WWP Packs $     1,577,473 $          7,986  1 % 
Warriors to Work $     9,149,559 $      280,745 3 % 
Transition Training Academy $     6,207,938 $      196,892 3 % 
Peer Support $     4,464,335 $      162,952 4 % 
WWP Talk $     1,731,217 $        17,208 1 % 
Independence Program $     5,415,463 $      217,739 4 % 
Warriors Speak $     2,102,805   $                 0 0 % 
Education Services $     3,154,146 $      898,438 28 % 
Wounded Warriors LT Trust $   28,000,000 $ 28,000,000 100 % 
    
Total $ 189,558,100 $ 42,100,421 22 % 
    
Less WWP Long Term Trust $ 161,558,100 $ 14,110,421 9 % 
Note: Data extracted from the Wounded Warrior IRS Form 990 for FY 2013 
 
In December 2015, the WWP’s National Alumni Director, Ryan Kules, described upcoming 
events for veterans across the United States to WWP staff members, which included (Mak, 
2016): 
• Family members receiving haircuts and spa services (Minnesota) 
• 25 veterans and family members attending A Christmas Carol (Alaska) 
• 35 veterans will spend an evening bowling (Colorado) 
• 20 veterans participate in a holiday Lego club night (Hawaii) 
• 100 veterans and guest attend a winter wonderland  (California) 






The Wounded Warrior Project drew the attention of the Senate. U.S. Senator Charles 
Grassley (R-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, asked interim CEO Anthony 
Odierno to provide an account of spending not provided on IRS tax forms, including expenses 
for travel, meetings, public relations, lobbying, and the Charity Defense Council. The WWP 
cooperated with Sen. Grassley’s request. On August 10, 2016, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
chairman’s staff met with the Wounded Warrior Project’s new CEO, retired Army Lieutenant 
General Michael Linnington.  The ongoing investigation includes the following (Gardner & 
Wallace, 2016; Grassley, 2016). 
• 33% of program services claimed by the WWP was free media and advertising. 
• The transfer of $37.1 million to the Wounded Warrior Long-Term Support Trust, which 
the organization included as program expenses on behalf of veterans. 
• 94% of program services to veterans in 2013 and 2014 consisted of tickets to sporting 
events. 
• In 2014, of the $242 WWP spent on program expenses, approximately $150 million was 
not devoted to veterans and a large portion of it was in-kind donations. 
 
In June 2016, The WWP board of directors selected Michael S. Winnington, a decorated 
veteran, retired Army Lieutenant General, and former employee of the Defense POW/MIA 
Accounting Agency (DPAA), as the permanent CEO of the organization.  Winnington inherited 
a nonprofit organization experiencing the impact of negative public relations. By September 
2016, the WWP reduced its workforce by 15 percent, over 600 employees, and it estimated lost 
revenues of close to $100 million due to a 25% decrease in donations (Hrywna, September 1, 
2016; Gardner, September 2, 2016).  As the Wounded Warrior Project rehabilitates its image, 
Linnigton indicated the need for an increased focus on veteran mental health concerns, 
specifically post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injuries, while enhancing organizational 






THE LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN LEGACY FOUNDATION 
Ruth Bernstein, University of Washington Tacoma 
 
Fraud and embezzlement has moved beyond the corporate sector and infiltrated the 
nonprofit sector! This was the outcome of an October, 26, 2013 Washington Post article 
(Stephens and Flaherty, 2013), which found that between 2008 and 2012, greater than 1,000 
nonprofit organizations revealed losses of hundreds of millions of dollars to theft, fraud, 
embezzlement, and other illegal behaviors. This translates to nonprofit and religious 
organizations experiencing one-sixth of all major embezzlements, second only to the financial 
services industry. In 2014, over 1.6 million registered nonprofits had $.5 trillion  in assets (not 
including the estimated 700,000 churches and other organizations not required to file with the 
IRS); this equates to approximately $100 billion a year in foregone tax revenue 
(https://gbq.com/articles/fraud-report-roils-not-for-profit-sector/).  Since 2008, nonprofit 
organizations have been required to report diversions of more than $250,000 or those that exceed 
5% of the annual gross on the Form 990 filed annually with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
This public disclosure enables the public to more easily evaluate how nonprofits handle their 
finances. A list of nonprofits who have indicated on the Form 990 that they have diversions has 
been compiled by GuideStar (a nonprofit watch-dog organization) and the Washington Post 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/nonprofit-diversions-database/). 
One nonprofit on the diversion list was the American Legacy Foundation (Legacy), based 
in Washington D.C.  In 2011, in response to the question about diversion of funds on the IRS 
Form 990, Legacy officials answered “yes,” but provided only a minimal explanation, stating 
that they became aware of a diversion in excess of $250,000.  Legacy officials indicated that the 
diversion was due to fraud committed by a former employee. Only subsequently was it revealed 






When the American Legacy Foundation (Legacy) officially opened its doors in 1999 it 
already controlled $1 billion in assets emanating from the November 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement reached between attorneys general from 46 states, five U.S. territories and the 
tobacco industry. Legacy’s mission was dedicated to building a world where young people reject 
tobacco and anyone can quit. As noted on the now defunct Legacy website, the Foundation 
developed programs that address the health effects of tobacco use, especially among vulnerable 
populations disproportionately affected by the toll of tobacco, through grants, technical 
assistance and training, partnerships, youth activism, and counter-marketing and grassroots 
marketing campaigns. With revenues exceeding $320 million and $50 million in annual 
expenditures (Stephens and Flaherty, 2013), Legacy set about fulfilling this mission by 
publicizing the adverse effects of smoking through massive anti-tobacco campaigns. Perhaps the 
most visible of these efforts was the so-called “Truth”-campaign and its controversial ads.  For 
example, during the 2000 Olympics, Legacy launched a broadcast showing individuals emptying 
trucks of 1,200 body bags and dumping them outside the headquarters of Philip Morris in New 
York, representing the number of Americans who die each day because of tobacco use. The 
organization enjoyed early success when  teen smoking started dropping, and Legacy was given 
much of the credit.  
On its website, Legacy informed the public that “being an honest and dependable source 
of information is our bread and butter, because the minute we start bending and manipulating the 
truth, we’re no better than the tobacco industry.” Moreover, the organization put together a high-
profile board with significant political wallop including Idaho Attorney General Lawrence 





Attorney General Tom Miller (D), former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet 
Napolitano, and Senator Thomas R. Carper (D-Del.) (Stephens and Flaherty, 2013). 
Key Issue: Fraud 
 In 2011, after twelve years of being a celebrated nonprofit, the following statement was 
found on Legacy’s tax form: 
In fiscal year 2011, Legacy became aware of an unauthorized diversion of assets in 
excess of $250,000 committed by a former employee…Foundation leadership notified 
both its board of directors and law enforcement, with whom the Foundation has 
cooperated fully in the ongoing investigation. A subsequent insurance claim was filed by 
Legacy and in fiscal year 2012, was successfully settled.  
  
 
The employee in question was computer specialist Deen Sanwoola. Hired in 1999 shortly 
after Legacy began operations, Sanwoola was tasked with creating the IT department. Sanwoola 
quickly became a highly appreciated employee and valued colleague, and over the years he 
developed close personal ties to many of Legacy’s leaders, including CFO Anthony T. O’Toole. 
“Everybody loved Deen,” O’Toole once acknowledged (Stephens and Flaherty, 2013).  
The board acknowledged the importance of a strong IT apparatus in order for the organization to 
fulfill its mission. Because the agency had strong finances from the very beginning, the board 
was willing to allocate significant resources to the new IT department for computers, monitors 
and software. Much of this equipment was purchased from a single Maryland company, Xclusiv.  
Apparently, there was a lack of internal financial controls, because the board and Legacy 
management granted Sanwoola the responsibilities for both ordering and recording the 
purchasing of electronic equipment. From 1999 to 2007, Sanwoola generated as many as 255 
invoices for computer equipment sold to the foundation before he decided to leave Legacy. In 
2007, Sanwoola moved to Nigeria where he operated Fun City, a gaming and entertainment 





raised any red flags. He rose to the position of assistant vice president with a $180,000 
compensation package, prior to the detection of the fraud. 
In late 2007, an executive at Legacy approached the CFO Anthony O’Toole with 
concerns regarding computers inventoried as purchased, but not in the Legacy offices. O’Toole, 
a good friend of Sanwoola, whose compensation package totaled $568,000 in 2012, ignored the 
complaint without investigating and failed to inform the CEO or the board. Three years later, the 
same employee took his concerns to a staff person closer to the CEO Cheryl Haelton. Within 
days after the second complaint, Legacy hired forensic examiners to investigate and Healton 
notified the board. A concurrent internal investigation determined that fraud had indeed occurred 
and determined the amount to be $3.4 million. Legacy board members notified the Washington 
D.C.  U.S. Attorney’s General Office. 
The forensic audit detected the first signs of trouble starting almost immediately after 
Sanwoola’s arrival in December 1999,  when a computer processor and other equipment was 
purchased for more than $18,000, yet the auditors concluded that it should have retailed for less 
than half of that cost.  Thereafter, both the number and size of purchases to the IT department 
continued to rise, peaking with 49 expenses recorded in in 2006. The audit found that Legacy 
often paid many times the market price, and in other cases made “phantom purchases” of 
computer equipment that never arrived. Of the 255 invoices generated by Sanwoola, two thirds 
of them were deemed to have been fraudulent, translating into $3.4 million.  
Despite finding that millions of dollars were believed to be missing,  the board and/or 
management kept the affair internal until the 2011 annual disclosure (see above), singed by 
O’Toole, which appears to downplay the total loss by only identifying a fraud of more than 





been “successfully settled” but the board never said anything regarding the size of the settlement 
nor whether it fell far short of the loss. Legacy commented that the absence of a total dollar 
figure in its public filing was the Foundation’s way of being restrained in describing its loss, in 
deference to the then-continuing federal investigation. Legacy general counsel, Ellen Vargyas, 
reported to the Washington Post during their investigation, that the organization “had no 
obligation to identify the full estimate of the loss” on the 2011 Form 990 or currently (Stephens 
and Flaherty, 2013). Additionally, she stressed that more information was in the Foundation’s 
2012 from 990 filing with the IRS. That filing included a reference to $1.3 million in 
miscellaneous revenue from an insurance settlement. The day after declining to reveal the 
amount of the loss to the Washington Post, Vargyas, wrote in an email, that the loss estimate was 
$3,391,648.  
The FBI visited Legacy in February of 2012, but, within weeks closed the investigation, 
because, despite warnings, the leadership of Legacy had taken more than three years to report the 
missing computers and lacked reliable records of what it owned. The U.S. Attorney’s General 
Office for the district also suspended its case after citing that there would be not criminal 
prosecution related to the fraud. Healton said she had expected the criminal case to clear the way 
to recover its lost money. But now there also will be no civil lawsuit seeking repayment, because 
as with the criminal case, the statute of limitations has passed.  
On Oct. 30, 2012, O’Toole again signed a federal disclosure form for Legacy showing 
that it received more than $1 million from an unspecified insurance settlement. Interestingly, the 
form does not mention the $3.4 million loss. In a final comment to the Washington Post, CEO 
Healton declared: “No excuses. It’s a terrible loss, and it shouldn’t have happened. If we lost 





American Legacy Foundation Rises Again: 
On September 8, 2015 Legacy changed its name to Truth Initiative (truthinitiative.org). 
Truth Initiative continues work the work of the American Legacy Foundation, striving toward 
“achieving a culture where all youth and young adults reject tobacco”. Truth Initiative 
concentrates its efforts in three areas: 1) Truth® a national prevention counter-marketing 
campaign; 2) the Schroeder Institute for Tobacco Research and Policy Studies which researches 
effective means to reduce the harms of tobacco, measures effectiveness of interventions and 
identifies best practices for tobacco control; and 3) working with community partners to counter 




Context and Theoretical Background 
The Wounded Warrior Project tragedy could potentially have been avoided by 
understanding nonprofit governance in terms of separation between principals (board chair and 
members) and agents (CEOs) (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Governance issues such as CEO and board 
relationships, board performance, leadership, and operations are frequently studied using two 
principal-agent theories: agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jenson, 1983) and 
stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Sundarmurthy & Lewis, 2001). 
While both theories are based on a contractual relationship between principal and agent, with 
agency theory, each actor has different goals and interests. The principal delegates control to the 
agent yet is dependent on the agent to provide services and information on their behalf. 
Unfortunately, the agent may not always act in ways that are beneficial to the principal creating 





this theory, the perspectives of CEOs and the board members regarding effective governance 
diverge because of the conflicting roles, goals and interests of principals and agents (Caers, Du 
Bois, Jergers, Geiter, Schepers, & Pepermans, 2006). Caers et al. (2006) note that the application 
of agency theory to board-management relationships is complex and may be influenced, among 
other things, by weak or strong board control, CEO power, information asymmetry, and the 
influence of the CEO on board elections and nominations. This divergence may have resulted in 
the Wounded Warrior board members being distant from the CEO and contributed to a lack of 
oversight of the CEO and other top leadership actions providing the opportunity for the agent to 
commit fraud. 
Possibly, the CEO and the board operated in separate environments, one where the CEO 
that accommodates the complexity of overseeing the operation of the nonprofit organization and 
another for the board members who are removed from the day-to-day operations and interact 
primarily with other members of the board. Agency problems frequently occur in nonprofits 
where a discrepancy between the objectives of those setting vision and those executing it exists 
(Du Bois, Caers, Jegers, De Cooman, De Gieter, & Pepermans, 2009).  
If the Wounded Warriors Project board and CEO had adopted a stewardship theory 
approach the outcome may have been different. Stewardship theory, which also addresses the 
principal-agent relationship, makes the assumption that collaboration and trust (rather than 
control and distrust) exists between the principal (board members) and agent (executives) in part 
because of their high identification with the organization. Stewardship theory may be viewed two 
ways (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, and Jegers, 2012): (a) the agent will act in the best interest 
of the principal even if their interests diverge because in doing so they will accomplish higher 





the principal’s and agent’s goals are in fact perfectly aligned because of commonality of interests 
(Sundarmurthy and Lewis, 2003). In either case, stewardship theory suggests that the governance 
perspectives of CEOs and the board will mostly overlap since they have compatible or aligned 
goals. If the Wounded Warriors Project board and the top leadership were more in alignment, it 
is unlikely that the top leadership would have felt that they had the right to abuse the 
organization’s funds. 
In the case of the Wounded Warriors Project, there was an apparent lack of knowledge by 
the board of directors of the executive leadership behaviors. This disconnect may be explained 
by (1) the failure of the board to educate themselves as to their roles and responsibilities, 
individually and collectively, as board members, (2) information asymmetry, and (3) CEO power 
(perceived or actual) over the board of directors. Scholarly and practitioner literature (e.g. 
Axelrod, 1994; Miller, 2002; BoardSource) has converged on a set of suggested board member 
roles and responsibilities. These responsibilities apply to both the individual board members and 
the board as a collective. Included in these roles and responsibilities are the evaluation and 
oversight of the CEO, the protection of assets, and the provision of financial control. The board 
should have ensured that new members were informed of their roles and responsibilities during 
the recruiting and orientation process.  
Board members rely on the CEO to provide the information necessary to make informed 
decisions and provide adequate organizational oversight. When the CEO holds back information, 
this action challenges the board to uncover unknown discrepancies and issues. In the case of 
miss-use of funds, board members should carefully examine the annual audit report and IRS 
Form 990. These actions would have enabled the board members to question the fraudulent use 





familiar with reading financial documents how to do so. When an organization has a CEO that is 
perceived as powerful and competent board members may become trusting and lazy with respect 
to CEO oversight, which provides the CEO the opportunity for engaging in fraudulent behaviors. 
Brown and Guo (2010) used CEO tenure as a proxy for CEO power and found that boards in 
which CEOs have greater power were less likely to talk about their monitoring and oversight 
functions. Finally, when CEOs have too much influence on selecting new board members, the 
board may feel less able to confront the CEO on issues of concern. 
Although it is important to make a distinction between the CEO and the board due to the 
need to separate governance and management, CEO and board member behaviors often 
contribute to ambiguity, confusion, and conflict (Otto, 2003). Nonprofit board members tend to 
believe that their CEOs will not pursue interests of their own and act in ways aligned with the 
organizational mission in support of stewardship theory. According to agency theory, the 
possibility exists that the agent or CEO has his or her personal agenda and acts independently of 
the board. This independence may be exacerbated when the board provides weak CEO control 
and oversight (Miller, 2002). Conversely, boards that exert too much control or power may lead 
to misperceptions and distrust between the board and the CEO. The notion that the board is 
solely responsible for organizational governance may be too narrow and needs to be replaced 
with the idea that governance is a set of responsibilities and actions that emerges from multiple 
actors (Stone and Ostrower, 2007). This may result in a blurring of board and CEO boundaries 
contrary to the delineation of nonprofit governance regarding of agency theory and the 







Suggestions For Classroom Instruction 
 
 The Wounded Warrior Project and American Legacy Foundation fiascos provides two 
primary teaching opportunities: governance and fraud. Governance issues of particular relevance 
are the lack of governance of the organization by the board of directors due to a failure to 
understand board member fiduciary duties and a poor understanding of individual and collective 
board member roles and responsibilities. The second topic focuses on fraud and the board 
member’s lack of financial literacy. Included in this discussion is the need for internal and 
external controls.  
Governance: The role of the board of directors is to provide governance for the organization. 
While many definitions of governance exist, a recent one from Cornforth and Brown (2014) 
states that “the systems and processes concerned with ensuring the overall direction, control, and 
accountability of the organization” (4-5). Activity #1 (below) focuses on the fiduciary duties of 
board members. A clear understanding of the fiduciary responsibilities may have encouraged the 
WWP and ALF board members to engage in CEO and financial oversight, and voice concerns 
when needed.  
Scholarly journals (e.g., Axelrod, 1994; Miller, 2002; Bernstein, Buse, and Slatten, 2015) 
and the practitioner literature (e.g., BoardSource) identify suggested roles and responsibilities for 
board members individually and collectively (see activity #2). The significance of board 
members’ understanding of their unique and distinct roles and responsibilities implies that 
deliberate action must be taking place to explain and identify the nature of these functions. 
Specific practices, such as board orientation and board training, have been identified as 
contributing factors leading to high-quality board performance and organizational performance 





Governance models: Once students understand the board’s fiduciary duties and their roles and 
responsibilities, the stage is then set for a more advanced analysis of governance models and 
principal-agent theories. Carver’s Policy Governance Model (2006), which is a board-centered 
model of governance based on assumptions of separation of between the CEO and the board of 
directors. In this model a clear line is drawn between the board’s  responsibility for policy-
making (as the “moral owners” of the organizations) and the executive’s responsibility for 
implementation and day-to-day operations. The board’s role is to establish stewardship through 
vision, mission, values, strategic planning, secure resources, defining clear roles and 
responsibilities, overseeing the articulation and documentation of board policies, and 
accountability to the stakeholders for organizational direction and performance. 
A second governance model is Chait, Ryan, and Taylor’s (2005) Governance-as-
Leadership model that supposes the board is reactive to staff initiatives. Instead of focusing on 
organizational vision, the board is so mired in managerial details and routine technical work, that 
they are effectively managing, while the CEO is articulating the visions beliefs, values, and 
cultures of the organization. The Governance-as-Leadership model is predicated on the board 
operating in the fiduciary (oversight), strategic (foresight), and generative (insight) modes of 
governance simultaneously. This model forces the board and CEO to work closely together on 
“what matters most”. 
The third governance model is based on the philosophy of “psychological centrality” 
(Herman & Heimovics, 2005), with the CEO leading the organization, but using a board-
centered leadership style, designed to support the board in meeting its governance 
responsibilities. In other words, the CEO is seen as responsible for the organization’s success or 





roles” (p. 156). However, this does not imply that the CEO holds more formal responsibility or 
authority than the board, but that the CEO is perceived as responsible, even by members of the 
board. Herman and Heimovics conclude that CEOs who have developed these board-centered 
leadership skills  are effective in their roles and also have hardworking, effective boards.   
Governance theories: While there are a number of governance theories, the principal– agent 
theories are most relevant to this case. A presentation of both agency and stewardship theory and 
their application to this case highlights the ease in which rogue CEOs may act independently of 
the board and potentially destroy the organization (see above section on Context and Theoretical 
Background).  
Fraud and Financial Literacy: The Wounded Warrior Project and the Amercian Legacy 
Foundation cases highlight the need for board and organizational fiscal responsibility. The board 
must, according to the duty of care, provide financial oversight and protect the organization’s 
assets and reduce the potential for fraud. Amazingly, nonprofit board members often lack even a 
modicum of financial literacy. Board members should include the ability to read the essential 
financial documents, including the Statement of Cash Flow, Income Statement or Statement of 
Activities, Statement of Financial Position or Balance Sheet, Budgets (including the Cash 
Budget), and Variance Reports. The Board Treasurer or the organization’s Chief Financial 
Officer should take responsibility for educating board members who lack basic financial literacy 
skills. With $40 billion lost to fraud annually in the nonprofit sector (Harvard University Hauser 
Center, n.d.), students should explore the fraud triangle (http://www.acfe.com/fraud-101.aspx). 
Activity #3, below, focuses on the fraud triangle, which highlights how fraud occurs when 





Internal controls: A nonprofit organization’s first line of defense against fraud is the 
establishment of internal controls.  You may choose to have the students watch in class or as 
assignment the following videos, Once Upon an Internal Control ( U-tube (2 parts): 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qeibzgSemY and www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KESsI04-XY.  The 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) divided internal controls into five components: 





1. Demonstrate commitment to integrity and 
ethical values 
2. Exercise oversight responsibility 
3. Establish structure, authority, and 
responsibility 
4. Demonstrate commitment to competence 
5. Enforce accountability 
 
Risk Assessment 
6. Specify suitable objectives 
7. Identify and analyze risk 
8. Assess fraud risk 
9. Identify and analyze significant change 
 
Internal Control Activities 
10. Select and develop control activities 
11. Select and develop general controls over 
technology 
12. Deploy through policies and procedures 
 
Information & Communication 
13. Use relevant information 
14. Communicate internally 
15. Communicate externally 
 
Monitoring 
16. Conduct ongoing and/or separate 
evaluations 
17. Evaluate and communicate deficiencies 
 
The idea behind all of the above policies, practices, and procedures employed by an organization 
is to achieve the following four objectives: 
1. To safeguard assets of the firm 
2. To ensure accuracy and reliability of accounting records and information 
3. To promote efficiency of the firm’s operations 












Discussion Questions  
 
1. What happened? Was there dishonesty present—embezzlement, theft, diversion of funds, 
nepotism, partiality, abuse of trust, lying, self-serving misspending, or just plain 
incompetence? 
2. Now that the organization has been exposed for fraudulent behavior, where did the 
“fault” lie? Is it with the staff, CEO, Board, funders, or other individuals or groups? Or 
was the “fault” embedded in the very structure and set-up of the organization as a whole? 
Was it due to a failure of imagination, planning, implementation, management, 
leadership, or accountability? Was there more than one kind of fault apparent or were 
different faults the responsibility of different actors?  
3. What is the responsibility of the board of directors in this fraud? What actions should the 
board now take? What actions can the board take to prevent this type of fraud from 
happening again in the future? At what stage in the case might intervention have saved 
things? Who should have identified the problems. 
4. What legal duties do board members need to abide by? How would knowledge of these 
duties potentially have eliminated the opportunity for fraud? 
5. What are the board member roles and responsibilities, both individually and collectively? 
How would knowing these have potentially avoided the fraud? 
6. What are internal controls and how could they have been utilized to prevent fraud in this 
case?  
7. The IRS may levy intermediate sanctions against board members. What are these 





received these sanctions? What should external regulatory authorities have done? Do 
laws and processes that apply to the nonprofit sector need reforming in light of this case? 
8. Many other nonprofit organizations have had serious public relations issues and have 
been investigated by Senator Grassley and continued to raise money and serve their 
mission. An example is the American Red Cross. Do you think that the WWP and ALF 
will survive?  
Questions particular to the WWP: 
1. At the time the Wounded Warrior Project crisis was exposed, reporters noted that the 
organization had $250 million in reserves. The 2014 budget was $330 million. Do you 
agree or disagree with the reporters that having this amount in reserves is problematic? 
Why or why not? How much reserves are recommended for nonprofit organizations? 
Why do you think this amount is suggested? 
2. What does this case teach us about the power dynamics that existed in the WWP or 
between the board of directors and the senior leadership prior to March 9, 2016? A 
follow-up question would be, who, in the WWP, uses power to influence the governance 
process and how was it deployed? Were there an obvious power struggle between the 
CEO and the Board of Directors? 
  
Student/Training Participant Activities 
Activity #1 Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience:  Tell the story of the Sibley Hospital 
Case (for example, Worth, 2014, p. 78-79). Introduce the Duties of Care, Loyalty, and 
Obedience. Write on the board each of the three board duties and ask the students to identify, 







• Paying attention 
• Complying with the law (federal, 
state and local) 
• Exercising due diligence in 
monitoring the organization’s 
finances 
• Board members not using their board 
position to enhance their own 
business or personal interests 
• Exercising common sense and not 
loose organizational assets due to 
recklessness, indifference, or failure 
to seek appropriate advice 
• Decisions made are consistent with 
the organization’s mission 
• Attending board meetings 
• Assuring that business done with 
board member’s companies are paid 
appropriately for the goods and 
services received 
• The organization’s founding 
documents and charter drive 
decision-making 
• Reading board materials 
• Not accepting unreasonable benefit 
from the organization’s funds 
• The by-laws of the organization are 
abided by 
• Not using organization funds to pay 
unreasonable amounts to other board 
members or executives 
• Making independent decisions 
• Putting the organization above self 
• Voting without understanding the 
issues 
 
Activity #2 Board Roles and Responsibilities: Ask the students to identify what they think are 
the roles and responsibilities of an individual board member. Record the responses on the board. 
Ask students to identify the collective roles and responsibilities of the board. Record these 
responses. Prompt the students to identify the accepted responsibilities (BoardSource.org; 
Bernstein, Buse, & Slatten, 2015). Compare where these two lists differ and overlap. Use this 
discussion to highlight the significance of board training. 
 
Activity #3 The Fraud Triangle:  Present the Fraud Triangle, below 
(http://www.acfe.com/fraud-101.aspx). Define fraud (for example: the intentional deception, 
















1. Give students time to look at the following website, which highlights the ten worst cases 
of fraud http://www.accounting-degree.org/scandals/.  
2. Present the following concepts:  
a. Fraudulent Statements – misstating financial statements in a way that benefits 
the perpetrator 
b. Corruption – an executive, manager or employee in collusion with an outsider  
(bribery, illegal gratuity, conflicts of interest, extortion) 
c. Asset Misappropriation – assets diverted in a way that benefits the perpetrator 
3. Ask students to identify the types of misappropriation (for example: skimming, cash 
larceny, credit card abuse, fictitious vendor schemes, check tampering, theft of cash, 
payroll schemes, expense reimbursement, conflicts of interest and misappropriation of 
non-cash assets). 
4. Brainstorm the pressures that promote fraud (such as drug, gambling or shopping 
additions, outstanding loans or other debts, marital affairs (for example the United Way 
scandal, see Glaser, 1994), declining revenues, etc.) 
5. Examining fraud may create the opportunity for a lively discussion as students begin to 
think about situations they have personally experienced where they resisted the 






Activity #4 Internal Controls: It is 2014 and you are the board chair of WWP or ALF. The 
board had voted to keep $1,000 in cash in the office to meet incidental cash requirements of 
under $100 per incident. An example would be to provide cash for a quick trip to Office Depot to 
get computer paper. You know that you need to implement internal controls on the cash so that it 
is not misappropriated.  Watch the video on the separation of duties. 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOSVTdw7Qbg).  For each of the internal controls listed 
below, describe what measures you would put in place to protect the cash. 
1. Establish responsibilities 
2. Maintain adequate records 
3. Double signature, authorizations and 
back-up documents 
4. Supervision 
5. Segregation of duties 
6. Control access 
7. Independent Verification of 
processes and records 
8. Fixed Asset Inventories 
9. Automated controls 
10. Background checks 
11. Audits and board-level oversight 
12. Encourage whistleblowers 
13. Strong compliance program 
14. Self-audits 
 
Activity #5 Internal Controls: Read and discuss the Nonprofit Quarterly article by Rick Cohen 
(https://www.charities.org/news/washington-post-piece-gives-misimpression-nonprofit-world-
rife-fraud).  This article puts a different perspective on the Washington Post Investigation into 
fraud within the nonprofit sector.  
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